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Abstract
We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of
buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the set of Walrasian
equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underde-
manded goods. Further, we give characterizations for the minimum and the maximum
Walrasian equilibrium price vectors of this economy. As a consequence of these char-
acterizations, we can say if overdemanded sets of goods and underdemanded sets of
goods exist at a price vector given its position in the price vector space with respect to
the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vectors. We also analyze
what happens with the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors if one of the buyers or one
of the goods is removed from the economy.
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1 Introduction
The classical Arrow-Debreu model (Arrow and Debreu, 1954) for studying competitive equi-
librium assumes goods to be divisible (commodities). But economies with indivisible goods
are common in many types of markets such as housing markets, job markets, and auctions
with goods like spectrum licenses. This paper investigates economies with indivisible goods
under the assumption that buyers have unit demand, i.e., every buyer can buy at most one
good. The unit demand assumption is common, for example, in settings of housing and job
markets.
In case of quasi-linear utilities of buyers, the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is
guaranteed, and the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors form a complete lattice
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972). In this work, we characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors using the notions of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods. A set of goods
is (weakly) overdemanded at a price vector if the number of buyers who demand goods only
from that set is greater than (or equal to) the number of goods in that set. A set of goods
is (weakly) underdemanded at a price vector if their prices are positive and the number of
buyers who demand goods from that set is less than (or equal to) the number of goods in
that set. Our first result is that a price vector is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if
and only if there is no set of overdemanded and underdemanded goods at that price vector.
Since overdemanded goods indicate the presence of excess demand and underdemand goods
indicate the presence of excess supply, our characterization reflects the intuition that a price
vector is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if there is no excess supply and no
excess demand.
The notion of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods has been studied in the
context of designing iterative auctions, where prices either increase monotonically (ascending
auctions) or decrease monotonically (descending auctions). Demange et al. (1986) use the
notion of overdemanded goods to design an ascending auction that terminates at the min-
imum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Analogously, Sotomayor (2002) uses the notion
of underdemanded goods to design a descending auction that terminates at the maximum
Walrasian equilibrium price vector. But both papers do not make any connection between
these notions. In fact, there are incorrect claims in both these papers about the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for a price vector to be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector:
Demange et al. (1986) wrongly claim that it is the absence of overdemanded goods, while
Sotomayor (2002) wrongly claims that it is the absence of underdemanded goods. The fact
that both claims are wrong can be checked by taking an example of a single indivisible good
with more than two buyers.
Gul and Stacchetti (2000) consider a model where they allow a buyer to buy more than
one good and having gross substitutes valuations. In such a model, a Walrasian equilibrium
price vector is guaranteed to exist, and the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors form
a complete lattice (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). For such a model, they provide a generaliza-
2
tion of Hall’s theorem (Hall, 1935), which results in a necessary condition for a Walrasian
equilibrium (see Theorem 3 in Gul and Stacchetti (2000)). Therefore, they do not charac-
terize the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors, which is what we will do for our model.
Also, Hall’s theorem is not enough to characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors
in our model. We show that we can use Hall’s theorem to guarantee only one of the two
conditions required for a Walrasian equilibrium. This is also the reason that the claims
in Demange et al. (1986) and Sotomayor (2002) about Walrasian equilibrium price vector
characterization are incorrect.
We will also characterize the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors. A price vector is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if no
set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at this price
vector. Similarly, absence of sets of weakly overdemanded goods and underdemanded goods
completely characterizes the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. These results can
be used to better understand the ascending and descending auctions in the literature. Despite
their incorrect claims, the auctions in the papers of Demange et al. (1986) and Sotomayor
(2002) terminate at one of the extreme Walrasian equilibrium price vectors. This can be
reconciled using our characterization results. In the ascending auction of Demange et al.
(1986), starting from the zero price vector, prices are raised on a minimal set of overdemanded
goods till no set of goods is overdemanded. At the zero price vector, no set of goods is weakly
underdemanded, and by increasing prices of a minimal overdemanded set of goods, no set
of goods is weakly underdemanded at the new price vector. Thus, this auction terminates
exactly when there is no overdemanded set of goods and no weakly underdemanded set of
goods. By our result, this is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Analogously,
in the descending auction of Sotomayor (2002), starting from a very high price vector, prices
are lowered on a minimal set of underdemanded goods till no set of goods is underdemanded.
At a very high price vector, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded, and by decreasing prices
of a minimal underdemanded set of goods, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded at the
new price vector. Hence, once no set of goods is underdemanded, the descending auction in
Sotomayor (2002) reaches the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
As a consequence of our characterizations, we can say if (weakly) overdemanded sets of
goods and (weakly) underdemanded sets of goods may or may not exist at a price vector
given its position in the price vector space with respect to the minimum and the maximum
Walrasian equilibrium price vectors. Further, this classification enables us to study the effect
of removing a buyer or a good on the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors. We show that the
lattice of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors moves up (down) if we remove a good (buyer).
Such movements of the lattice is consistent with the intuition that prices move up (down)
when supply is lowered (increased) by removing a good (removing a buyer). We further
show that the new maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vector after removing a good is
a Walrasian equilibrium price vector for the original economy (i.e., with all the goods).
Similarly, the new minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector after removing a buyer is
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still a Walrasian equilibrium price vector of the original economy (i.e., with all the buyers).
We also show that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector before removing a good
is still a Walrasian equilibrium price vector after removing that good and that the maximum
Walrasian equilibrium price vector before removing a buyer is still a Walrasian equilibrium
price vector after removing that buyer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally describe the
model. Section 3 describes the concepts of sets of (weakly) overdemanded and (weakly)
underdemanded goods. Section 4 gives the characterizations of the different regions of price
vectors. In Section 5, we discuss some implications of our characterization results, and we
conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
There is a set of indivisible goods N = {0, 1, . . . , n} for sale to a set of buyers M = {1, . . . ,m}.
Each buyer can be assigned to at most one good. The good 0 is a dummy good which can be
assigned to more than one buyer. The value of buyer i ∈ M on good j ∈ N is vij, assumed to
be a non-negative real number. Every buyer has zero value on the dummy good. A feasible
allocation µ assigns every buyer i ∈ M a good µi ∈ N such that no good in N \ {0} is
assigned to more than one buyer. Notice that a feasible allocation assigns every buyer a
good (may be the dummy good), but some goods may not be assigned to any buyer. We say
good j ∈ N is unassigned in µ if there exists no buyer i ∈ M with µi = j. Let Γ be the set
of all feasible allocations. An efficient allocation is a feasible allocation µ∗ ∈ Γ satisfying∑
i∈M viµ∗i ≥
∑
i∈M viµi for all µ ∈ Γ.
A price vector p ∈ Rn+1+ assigns every good j ∈ N a nonnegative price pj with p0 = 0.
We assume quasi-linear utilities. Given a price vector p, the payoff of buyer i ∈ M on
good j ∈ N at price vector p is vij − pj. The demand set of buyer i at price vector p is
Di(p) = {j ∈ N : vij − pj ≥ vik − pk ∀ k ∈ N}.
Definition 1 A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is a price vector p and a feasible allocation
µ such that
µi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ M (WE-1)
and
pj = 0 for all j ∈ N that are unassigned in µ. (WE-2)
If (p, µ) is a WE, then p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector and µ is a Wal-
rasian equilibrium allocation.
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It is well known that every allocation in a WE allocation is an efficient allocation
(Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). The set of WE price vectors, which is non-empty 1, form a
complete lattice (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) 2. This implies the existence of a unique min-
imum WE price vector (pmin) and a unique maximum WE price vector (pmax). Of all the
WE price vectors, pmin stands out since it corresponds to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
payments of buyers assigned to them in a WE (Leonard, 1983). The VCG payments are
defined as the externality of a buyer on the remaining buyers (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971;
Groves, 1973), and the VCG mechanism is an efficient and strategy-proof mechanism. In this
work, we aim to characterize all WE price vectors, in particular pmin and pmax, and discuss
its implications.
For any two price vector p and p′ of equal dimension, we write p = p′ if pj = p′j for all
j. If there exists a j at which pj 6= p′j, then we write p 6= p′. If pj ≥ p′j for all j then we
write p ≥ p′ or p′ ≤ p. If p ≥ p′ but p 6= p, then we write p  p′ or p′  p. If there exists
some j for which pj < p
′
j, then we write p  p′ or p′  p.
3 Overdemand and Underdemand
We define demanders of a set of goods S ⊆ (N \ {0}) at price vector p as B(S,p) = {i ∈
M : Di(p) ∩ S 6= ∅}. We define the exclusive demanders of a set of goods S ⊆ (N \ {0})
at price vector p as O(S,p) = {i ∈ M : Di(p) ⊆ S}. Clearly, for every p and every
S ⊆ (N \ {0}), we have O(S,p) ⊆ B(S,p). We denote the cardinality of a finite set S as
#S. Given a price vector p, define N+(p) = {j ∈ N : pj > 0}. By definition 0 /∈ N+(p) for
any p.
Definition 2 A set of goods S is (weakly) overdemanded at price vector p if S ⊆ (N \
{0}) and #O(S,p)(≥) > #S.
The notion of overdemanded sets of goods can be found in Demange et al. (1986) and
Sankaran (1994), who use it as a basis for the design of ascending auctions for our model.
For settings where a buyer can buy more than one good, the notion of overdemanded goods
has been generalized in Gul and Stacchetti (2000) and de Vries et al. (2005), who also use it
as a basis for the design of ascending auctions for general models.
1The existence of WE price vectors follow from a standard linear programming duality argument, and is
proved in Shapley and Shubik (1972). The efficient allocation problem can be written as a standard one-to-
one assignment problem, which always has an optimal solution (Leonard, 1983; Bikhchandani and Ostroy,
2002). So, the dual of such a linear program will always have an optimal solution. Such optimal dual
solutions correspond to the WE price vectors (Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002). Moreover, conditions WE-1
and WE-2 are complementary slackness conditions corresponding to these primal and dual linear programs.
2We can see that the set of WE price vectors is a special type of lattice. Given a WE (p, µ), the equations
that define this price vector are pj − pµi ≥ [viµi − vij ] for all i ∈ M and for all j ∈ N . These are lines in
two dimensions, and they are either parallel to one of the axes (since p0 = 0 for all price vectors) or at 45
degrees to both the axes in that dimension.
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Goods
Buyers 0 1 2
1 0 8 4
2 0 6 3
3 0 1 1
Table 1: An Illustrating Example
Definition 3 A set of goods S is (weakly) underdemanded at price vector p if S ⊆
N+(p) and #B(S,p)(≤) < #S.
The notion of underdemanded sets of goods can be found in Sotomayor (2002) 3, who
uses it to design descending auctions for our model. The notion of weakly underdemanded
sets of goods can be found in Mishra and Veeramani (2006), who use it to give an extension
of the auction in Sotomayor (2002).
Both concepts give us an idea about the imbalance of supply and demand in the economy,
albeit differently. A measure of total demand on a set of goods is obtained by counting the
number of exclusive demanders of these goods in the notion of sets of overdemanded goods
and by counting the number of demanders of these goods in the notion of sets of underde-
manded goods. However, the dummy good is never part of a set of overdemanded goods and
zero priced goods, which always includes the dummy good, are never part of sets of under-
demanded goods. In some sense, the existence of sets of overdemanded (underdemanded)
goods at a price vector indicates that there is excess demand (supply) in the economy. Since
both overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods may exist at a given price vector,
excess demand and excess supply can exist simultaneously in the economy.
We give an example to illustrate the notions of sets of overdemanded and underdemanded
goods. Consider an example with three buyers and two goods. Valuations of buyers are given
in Table 1. The minimum WE price vector for the example in Table 1 is pmin = (0, 4, 1).
The maximum WE price vector for the example in Table 1 is pmax = (0, 7, 3). In Table 2,
we give various price vectors and describe our notions at those price vectors. In Figure 1, we
draw a portion of the price vector space, including the set of WE price vectors. By looking
at Figure 1, the reader can see that different price vectors in Table 2 belong to different
regions in Figure 1.
The following insights from Table 2 are worth noting.
• At price vector (0, 0, 0) no set of goods is underdemanded since N+((0, 0, 0)) = ∅. But
sets of underdemanded goods may exist at low price vectors (for example good 2 is
3There is a small difference between our definition of underdemanded goods and the definition in
Sotomayor (2002). Sotomayor (2002) assumes the existence of a dummy buyer who demands every good
with zero price and who can be allocated more than one good. Then, a set of goods S is underdemanded
in Sotomayor (2002) at a price vector p if every good in N is demanded by a buyer (may be the dummy
buyer), S ⊆ N+(p) and #B(S,p) < #S.
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p D1(p) D2(p) D3(p) OD UD Weakly OD Weakly UD
(0, 0, 0) {1} {1} {1, 2} {1}, {1, 2} ∅ {1}, {1, 2} ∅
(0, ε
2
, ε) {1} {1} {1} {1}, {1, 2} {2} {1}, {1, 2} {2}
(0 < ε < 1)
(0, ε, 3 + ε) {1} {1} {1} {1}, {1, 2} {2} {1}, {1, 2} {2}
(0, 4, 1) {1} {1, 2} {0, 2} ∅ ∅ {1}, {1, 2} ∅
(0, 4− ε, 1 + ε) {1} {1} {0} {1} {2} {1}, {1, 2} {2}, {1, 2}
(0, 5, ε) {2} {2} {2} {2}, {1, 2} {1} {2}, {1, 2} {1}
(0, 5, 2) {1} {1, 2} {0} ∅ ∅ {1}, {1, 2} {2}, {1, 2}
(0, 5, 2 + ε) {1} {1} {0} {1} {2} {1}, {1, 2} {2}, {1, 2}
(0, 6, 1 + ε) {2} {2} {0} {2} {1} {2}, {1, 2} {1}, {1, 2}
(0, 6, 4) {1} {0, 1} {0} ∅ {2} {1} {2}, {1, 2}
(0, 7, 3) {1, 2} {0, 2} {0} ∅ ∅ ∅ {1}, {1, 2}
(0, 7 + ε, ε) {2} {2} {2} {2}, {1, 2} {1} {2}, {1, 2} {1}
(0, 8, 2) {2} {2} {0} {2} {1} {2}, {1, 2} {1}, {1, 2}
(0, 7 + ε, 3 + ε) {1, 2} {0} {0} ∅ {1, 2} ∅ {1}, {2}, {1, 2}
Table 2: Illustration of overdemand (OD) and underdemand (UD)
underdemanded at price vector (0, ε
2
, ε)). In general, the existence of sets of underde-
manded or overdemanded goods depends on the relative prices of goods, in addition
to the entire price vector.
• Price vectors (0, 4, 1), (0, 5, 2), and (0, 7, 3) are WE price vectors. No set of goods is
overdemanded and no set of goods is underdemanded at these price vectors. Moreover,
at the minimum WE price vector (0, 4, 1) no set of goods is weakly underdemanded.
Similarly, at the maximum WE price vector (0, 7, 3) no set of goods is weakly overde-
manded. These are no coincidences. In Theorems 1, 2, and 3 we formalize these
relations of sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods with WE price vectors.
• At low enough price vectors, we expect sets of overdemanded goods to exist. In Table
2, we see that at price vectors below the minimum WE price vector (4, 1), there is
always an overdemanded set of goods. Similarly, at price vectors above the maximum
WE price vector (7, 3) there is always an underdemanded set of goods. We formalize
these results in Corollaries 1 and 2.
4 Characterization Results
In this section, we give a characterization of the price vector space. Our characterization of
the WE price vectors is based on the notions of sets of overdemanded and underdemanded
goods. Further, together with the notions of sets of weakly overdemanded and weakly un-
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derdemanded goods, we characterize the minimum and maximum WE price vectors and the
price vectors that are not WE price vectors.
Define M+(p) = {i ∈ M : 0 /∈ Di(p)} for every price vector p. Notice that M+(p) =
O(N \ {0},p). Now, consider the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Suppose no set of goods is overdemanded. Then there exists a feasible allocation
in which every buyer is assigned a good from his demand set.
Proof : Since N \ {0} is not overdemanded, #(N \ {0}) ≥ #O(N \ {0},p) = #M+(p).
Consider S ⊆ M+(p). Let T = ∪i∈SDi(p). Since 0 /∈ T and T is not overdemanded, we
get #T ≥ #O(T,p) ≥ #S. Using Hall’s theorem (Hall, 1935), there is a feasible allocation
in which every buyer i in M+(p) can be assigned a good in Di(p), and every buyer in
M \M+(p) can be assigned the dummy good 0, which is in his demand set. ¥
Lemma 2 Suppose no set of goods is underdemanded. Then there exists a feasible allocation
in which every good in N+(p) is assigned to a buyer who is a demander of that good.
Proof : Since N+(p) is not underdemanded, #N+(p) ≤ #B(N+(p),p) ≤ #M . Consider
T ⊆ N+(p). Let S = B(T,p). Since T is not underdemanded, #T ≤ #B(T,p) = #S.
Using Hall’s theorem (Hall, 1935), there is a feasible allocation in which every good in N+(p)
can be assigned to a buyer who is a demander of that good. ¥
The absence of only overdemanded or only underdemanded sets of goods cannot guarantee
a WE price vector. For instance, consider an example with a single good and three buyers
with values 10, 6, and 3. At any price higher than 10, the good is not overdemanded but it is
not a WE price. Similarly, at any price between 3 and 6, the good is not underdemanded but
it is not a WE price 4. In some sense, Lemma 1 says that condition (WE-1) in Definition 1
is satisfied in the absence of overdemanded goods, but condition (WE-2) may be violated.
Similarly, Lemma 2 says that condition (WE-2) in Definition 1 is satisfied in the absence of
underdemanded goods, but condition (WE-1) may be violated. In Demange et al. (1986),
it is claimed that the absence of overdemanded goods at a price vector is both necessary and
sufficient for that price vector to be a WE price vector. Analogously, Sotomayor (2002) claims
that the absence of underdemanded goods at a price vector is necessary and sufficient for
that price vector to be a WE price vector. As we show next, both these claims are incorrect.
Only the absence of both underdemanded and overdemanded sets of goods guarantees the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Theorem 1 A price vector p is a WE price vector if and only if no set of goods is overde-
manded and no set of goods is underdemanded at p.
4Even if we consider the slightly different definition of underdemanded goods in Sotomayor (2002), no
good is underdemanded at any price between 3 and 6. But there is no WE price between 3 and 6.
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Proof : Suppose p is a WE price vector. By condition (WE-2), there exists a feasible
allocation in which every good in N+(p) can be assigned to a unique demander of that
good. Hence no set of goods is underdemanded. If some set of goods, say, S ⊆ N \ {0}, is
overdemanded, then condition (WE-1) will fail for some buyer in O(S,p) in every feasible
allocation, which is not true since p is a WE price vector. Hence no set of goods can be
overdemanded.
For the other direction of the proof, assume that no set of goods is overdemanded and
no set of goods is underdemanded at price vector p. By Lemma 1 there is a non-empty set
of feasible allocations Γ∗ that allocates every buyer a good from his demand set. Choose
an allocation µ ∈ Γ∗ for which the number of goods from N+(p) that is allocated in µ is
maximal over all the allocations in Γ∗. Let us call such an allocation a maximal allocation
in Γ∗. Let T 0 = {j ∈ N+(p) : µi 6= j ∀i ∈ M}. If T 0 = ∅, then by definition (p, µ) is a WE.
We will show that T 0 is empty. Assume for contradiction that T 0 is not empty.
We first show that for every buyer i ∈ M , if µi /∈ N+(p) then T 0 ∩Di(p) = ∅. Assume
for contradiction for some i ∈ M with µi /∈ N+(p) there exists j ∈ T 0 ∩Di(p). In that case,
we can construct a new allocation µ′ in which µ′i = j and µ
′
k = µk for all k 6= i. Allocation
µ′ is in Γ∗ and assigns one good more from N+(p) than µ does. This is a contradiction since
µ is a maximal allocation in Γ∗. As a result of this, the demanders of T 0 are assigned to
goods in N+(p) \ T 0. Let X0 = B(T 0,p). So, X0 ⊆ {i ∈ M : µi ∈ N+(p) \ T 0}. Now, for
any k ≥ 0, consider a sequence (T 0, X0, T 1, X1, . . . , T k, Xk), where for every 1 ≤ q ≤ k, T q
is the set of goods assigned to buyers in Xq−1 in µ and Xq = B(∪qr=0T r,p) \ B(∪q−1r=0T r,p).
Note that by definition T q ∩ T r = ∅ for every q 6= r.
We show that if T q 6= ∅ and T q ⊆ N+(p) for all 0 ≤ q ≤ k, then there exists T k+1 6= ∅
such that T k+1 ⊆ N+(p) and T k+1∩T q = ∅ for all 0 ≤ q ≤ k. By definition of Xq, 0 ≤ q ≤ k,
and T q, 1 ≤ q ≤ k,








#T q + #Xk. (1)





Using equations (1) and (2), we get #Xk ≥ #T 0. Since T 0 is non-empty, Xk is non-empty.
Define T k+1 as the set of goods assigned to buyers in Xk in µ. Hence T k+1 is non-empty.
By definition T k+1 ∩ T q = ∅ for every 0 ≤ q ≤ k. To show that T k+1 ⊆ N+(p), assume for
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contradiction that there exists a buyer ik ∈ Xk such that µik /∈ N+(p). By definition of Xk,
ik should demand some good jk ∈ T k. Now consider the sequence (ik, jk, ik−1, jk−1, . . . , i0, j0),
where for every 0 ≤ q ≤ k−1, iq−1 is the buyer assigned to good jq in µ (note that iq−1 ∈ Xq−1
by definition) and jq−1 is a good demanded by iq−1 from T q−1 (such a good exists by the
definition of Xq−1 and T q−1). Now, construct an allocation µ′ with µ′iq = jq for all 0 ≤ q ≤ k
and µ′i = µi for any i /∈ {i0, . . . , ik}. Clearly, µ′ ∈ Γ∗. By assigning ik to jk, µ′ assigns one
good more from N+(p) than µ does, contradicting the fact that µ is a maximal allocation in
Γ∗. Hence T k+1 ⊆ N+(p). This process can be repeated infinitely many times starting from
T 0. So (T 0, T 1, . . .) is an infinite sequence such that T q ∩ T r = ∅ for every q 6= r, T q 6= ∅ for
all q, and T q ⊆ N+(p) for all q. This is a contradiction since N+(p) is finite. So, T 0 = ∅,
and therefore (p, µ) is a WE. ¥
The characterization in Theorem 1 shows that given a price vector and the demand sets
of buyers, it is possible to check if the given price vector is a WE price vector by checking
for the existence of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods. In some sense this is
a generalization of Hall’s theorem (Hall, 1935) for our model.
Notice that absence of overdemanded goods requires that there is no excess demand in
a weak sense, since we only count the exclusive demanders in checking for overdemanded
goods. Similarly, absence of underdemanded goods requires that there is no excess supply
in a weak sense, since zero priced goods are not counted while checking for underdemanded
goods. Theorem 1 assures the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium at a price vector if there
is neither excess demand nor excess supply. This provides a direct economic interpretation
of our result.
Given the lattice structure of the set of WE price vectors, one is tempted to think that a
precise characterization of the minimum and maximum WE price vectors is possible, where
we relax the notions of excess demand and excess supply. We do this in the next two
theorems. In some sense, these theorems provide further generalizations of Hall’s theorem
for our model.
Theorem 2 A price vector p is equal to pmin if and only if there is no overdemanded set of
goods and no weakly underdemanded set of goods at p.
Proof : Suppose p = pmin. By Theorem 1, no set of goods is overdemanded at p. We
need to show that no set of goods is weakly underdemanded. Assume for contradiction
that a set of goods, say, S ⊆ N , is weakly underdemanded. By definition S ⊆ N+(p) and
#B(S,p) ≤ #S. Since p is a WE price vector, every good in S is assigned to a buyer in
his demand set at price vector p. So, #B(S,p) ≥ #S. This implies that #B(S,p) = #S.
Since S ⊆ N+(p), we can decrease the price of goods in S by a sufficiently small amount
so that no buyer in M \ B(S,p) demands a good from S. Buyers in B(S,p) will continue
to demand goods from S after such a price decrease. Thus, the new price vector is a WE
price vector, and is smaller than p = pmin. This is a contradiction since pmin is the unique
minimum WE price vector.
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Now, we assume that no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly
underdemanded at a price vector p. Applying Theorem 1, p is a WE price vector. Assume
for contradiction that p 6= pmin. By definition of pmin, pj ≥ pminj for all j ∈ N and there
exists a set of goods S = {j ∈ N : pj > pminj }. By our assumption S 6= ∅. For all j ∈ S, it
holds that pj > p
min
j ≥ 0, implying S ⊆ N+(p). Because S is not weakly underdemanded,
#B(S,p) > #S. (3)
Since prices of goods in S strictly decrease from p to pmin but remain the same for goods in
N \S, buyers in B(S,p) will only demand goods from S at price vector pmin. Using equation
(3), we can write #O(S,pmin) ≥ #B(S,p) > #S. This means S is overdemanded at price
vector pmin. This is a contradiction by Theorem 1. ¥
At a WE price vector, every good with positive price is allocated to some demander of
that good. Hence, the number of demanders of such a set of positive price goods is at least
equal to the number of goods in that set. Absence of weakly underdemanded goods at a
WE price vector implies that for a set of goods with positive price, there is some buyer not
allocated to these goods who demands a good from that set. This provides an alternate
interpretation of Theorem 2. Also, the characterization of the minimum WE price vector
gives us an idea about the existence of overdemanded and weakly underdemanded sets of
goods in other regions of price vector space.
Corollary 1 If p  pmin, then there exists an overdemanded set of goods. Further, if
p  pmin, then there exists a weakly underdemanded set of goods.
Proof : Suppose p  pmin. Let S = {j ∈ N : pj < pminj }. Since p  pmin, S 6= ∅. Further,
because pminj > pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S, S ⊆ N+(pmin). Since prices of goods in S decrease
from pmin to p while prices of goods in N \ S do not decrease, B(S,pmin) ⊆ O(S,p). So,
#O(S,p) ≥ #B(S,pmin) > #S, where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 (S is not
weakly underdemanded at pmin). Hence S is overdemanded at p.
Now, suppose p  pmin. Define S ′ = {j ∈ N : pj > pminj }. Because p  pmin, S ′ 6= ∅.
Further, since pj > p
min
j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S ′, S ′ ⊆ N+(p). Since prices of goods in S decrease
from p to pmin while prices of goods in N \ S ′ do not decrease, B(S ′,p) ⊆ O(S ′,pmin). So,
#B(S ′,p) ≤ #O(S ′,pmin) ≤ #S ′, where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 (S ′ is
not overdemanded at pmin). Hence S ′ is weakly underdemanded at p. ¥
In every region of the price vector space with respect to pmin, Corollary 1 shows if an
overdemanded set of goods or a weakly underdemanded set of goods always exists in that
region. To identify regions in the price vector space where underdemanded goods and weakly
overdemanded goods can be guaranteed, we give a characterization of the maximum WE price
vector.
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Theorem 3 A price vector p is equal to pmax if and only if there is no weakly overdemanded
set of goods and no underdemanded set of goods at p.
Proof : Let p = pmax. By Theorem 1, no set of goods is underdemanded. We will show
that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded. Assume for contradiction that for some
∅ 6= S ⊆ N \ {0}, S is weakly overdemanded. So, #O(S,p) ≥ #S. Since p is a WE price
vector, S cannot be overdemanded. Hence, #O(S,p) = #S. By definition of WE, any WE
allocation should assign buyers in O(S,p) goods from S. Since buyers in O(S,p) do not
demand the dummy good, their payoff is positive. Hence, by increasing the price of goods in
S by a sufficiently small amount, buyers in O(S,p) will continue to demand the same goods
in S at the higher price, and we will reach a higher WE price vector. This is a contradiction
since p = pmax is the unique maximum WE price vector.
Now, assume that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded and no set of goods is un-
derdemanded at p. Using Theorem 1, p is a WE price vector. Assume for contradiction
p 6= pmax. By definition of pmax, pj ≤ pmaxj for all j ∈ N and there exists a non-empty set
of goods S = {j ∈ N : pj < pmaxj }. Since S is not weakly overdemanded at p, we can write
#O(S,p) < #S. (4)
By increasing prices from p to pmax, prices of goods in N \ S do not increase but prices
of goods in S increase. This means buyers in M \ O(S,p) will not have goods from S in
their demand set at pmax. Using equation (4) we can write #B(S,pmax) ≤ #O(S,p) < #S.
Since prices of goods in S increase, S ⊆ N+(pmax). Hence, S is underdemanded at pmax.
This is a contradiction. ¥
Consider a WE price vector and a set of goods that are allocated in that WE. If this
set of goods is not weakly overdemanded, then some of the buyers allocated to these goods
must demand a good not in this set of goods. This provides an alternate interpretation of
Theorem 3. Analogous to Corollary 1 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If p  pmax, then there exists a weakly overdemanded set of goods. Further, if
p  pmax, then there exists an underdemanded set of goods.
Proof : The proof is analogous to Corollary 1 except that we make use of Theorem 3 instead
of Theorem 2. ¥
The results in the paper so far are illustrated in Figure 1 for the example in Table
1. The labelling in various regions of the figure indicates whether (weakly) overdemanded
sets of goods ((W)OD) and (weakly) underdemanded sets of goods ((W)UD) exist in these
regions of the the price vector space. By Theorem 1, there is no set of overdemanded and
underdemanded goods in the lattice corresponding to the WE price vector region in Figure
1. The minimum and the maximum WE price vectors are characterized by Theorems 2 and
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No OD goods and no UD goods
Figure 1: Various regions of the price vector space for the example in Table 1
3, respectively. The other regions in Figure 1 are labelled using Corollaries 1 and 2. For
example, for any price vector in the upper-right corner, an underdemanded set of goods
exist, whereas for any price vector in the lower-left corner, an overdemanded set of goods
exist. The reader can also see how different price vectors in Table 2 lie in various regions of
Figure 1. Notice that once every set of goods is weakly underdemanded, then no set of goods
can be overdemanded. This happens, for example when all prices are set equal or above the
highest valuation of the goods. Also, there exist regions (upper-left and lower-right corners
in Figure 1) where sets of underdemanded and overdemanded goods co-exist.
We can say something more about various price vectors than what the results in Corollar-
ies 1 and 2 seem to indicate. If we decrease the prices of positive price goods at the minimum
WE price vector by an equal amount such that no price goes below zero, then at the new
price vector no weakly underdemanded goods exist. But, by Corollary 1, some set of goods
is overdemanded. So, if pmin 6= 0, then there is some non-zero price vector p  pmin where
no set of goods is weakly underdemanded and only some set of goods is overdemanded. This
argument illustrates that we can draw a piecewise linear path from the minimum WE price
vector to the zero price vector along which no set of goods is weakly underdemanded but
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some set of goods is overdemanded.
Similarly, if we increase the prices of positive price goods by an equal amount from the
maximum WE price vector, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded at the new price vector,
but some set of goods is underdemanded. So, the 45 degree straight line from the maximum
WE price vector in the north-east direction is a set of (infinite) price vectors where no set
of goods is weakly overdemanded but some set of goods is underdemanded.
Our earlier results do not say anything about the structure of the sets of overdemanded
and underdemanded goods. In Table 2, we can see that a good can be both part of an
overdemanded set of goods and an underdemanded set of goods at some price vector, e.g.
at price vector (0, ε, 3 + ε), good 2 is underdemanded, and is also in the overdemanded
set {1, 2}. But this anomaly is absent if we consider minimal overdemanded and minimal
underdemanded sets of goods. The following theorem reconciles these ideas.
Theorem 4 If a good is part of a minimal overdemanded set of goods at a price vector,
then it cannot be part of a minimal weakly underdemanded set of goods at that price vector.
Similarly, if a good is part of a minimal weakly overdemanded set of goods at a price vector,
then it cannot be part of a minimal underdemanded set of goods at that price vector.
Proof : Consider any price vector p. Let Su be a minimal weakly underdemanded set of
goods and let So be a minimal overdemanded set of goods at the price vector p. We will show
that Su∩So = ∅. Since Su is weakly underdemanded at p, #O(Su,p) ≤ #B(Su,p) ≤ #Su.
This shows that Su is not overdemanded at p. So, Su 6= So. Assume for contradiction
Su ∩ So 6= ∅. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: So ( Su. Since Su is minimal weakly underdemanded at p and Su \ So is
non-empty, Su \ So is not weakly underdemanded. So, we can write
#B(Su \ So,p) > #(Su \ So). (5)
Since Su is weakly underdemanded we get
#B(Su,p) ≤ #Su. (6)
Since So is overdemanded we get
#O(So,p) > #So. (7)
Now, since So ( Su and using equations (6) and (7)
#(Su \ So) = #Su −#So
> #B(Su,p)−#O(So,p)
≥ #B(Su \ So,p).
The last inequality comes from the fact that O(So,p) ∪ B(Su \ So,p) ⊆ B(Su,p). Using
equation (5), we get a contradiction.
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Case 2: Su ( So. Since So is minimal overdemanded and So \ Su is not empty, So \ Su
is not overdemanded. This gives us
#O(So \ Su,p) ≤ #(So \ Su). (8)
Now, since Su ( So and using equations (6) and (7)
#(So \ Su) = #So −#Su
< #O(So,p)−#B(Su,p)
≤ #O(So \ Su,p).
The last inequality comes from the fact that O(So,p) ⊆ O(So \ Su,p) ∪ B(Su,p). Using
equation (8), we get a contradiction.
Case 3: Su ∩So = T , T 6= Su, T 6= So, and T is non-empty. Since Su is minimal weakly
underdemanded, Su \ T is not weakly underdemanded. This gives us
#B(Su \ T,p) > #(Su \ T ). (9)
Similarly, So \ T is not overdemanded, which gives us
#O(So \ T,p) ≤ #(So \ T ). (10)
Denote Y = O(So,p) \ O(So \ T,p). From the definition of Y , every buyer in Y demands
goods from So only but at least some good from T . Hence, Y ∩ B(Su \ T,p) = ∅. This
results in the following set of inequalities by the definition of Y and using equations (7), (9)
and (10)
#B(Su,p) ≥ #B(Su \ T,p) + #Y
> #(Su \ T ) + #O(So,p)−#O(So \ T,p)
> #Su −#T + #So −#(So \ T )
= #Su.
The last inequality follow from the fact that T ( So and T ( Su. It implies that Su is
not weakly underdemanded. This is a contradiction.
Using an analogous proof, it can be shown that if a good is part of a minimal weakly
overdemanded set of goods, then it cannot be part of a minimal underdemanded set of goods.
¥
5 Implications of Characterization Results
Our characterizations, besides being of theoretical interest, has some implications in some
practical applications. These applications mainly arise in contexts where the minimum or the
maximum WE price vector is used to price the goods. We describe some of these applications
below, and implications of our characterization results in these applications.
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5.1 Marginal Economies
Marginal economies, in which either a single buyer or a single good is removed from the
original economy, play a vital role in various game theoretic solutions. For example, the
payment of a buyer in the celebrated VCG mechanism can be computed by analyzing the
marginal economy corresponding to that buyer. Also, marginal payoff vectors are focal point
of many cooperative game solutions (e.g., the Shapley value).
In general, we denote an economy with goods A ⊆ N with 0 ∈ A and buyers B ⊆ M
as E(A,B) (i.e., only goods in A and buyers in B are present). Denote as pmin(A,B)
and pmax(A,B) respectively the minimum and the maximum WE price vectors of economy
E(A, B). Also, for any price vector p ∈ R|A|+ the vector of components of p except the jth
component pj is denoted as p−j. Using our earlier results we show next how the lattice of
WE price vectors shift in marginal economies.
Theorem 5 For every A ⊆ N with 0 ∈ A and B ⊆ M ,
(a) pmin(A,B \ {i}) ≤ pmin(A,B) ≤ pmax(A, B \ {i}) ≤ pmax(A,B) for all i ∈ B,
(b) pmin−j (A,B) ≤ pmin(A \ {j}, B) ≤ pmax−j (A,B) ≤ pmax(A \ {j}, B) for all j ∈ A.
Proof : Proof of (a): For some i ∈ B, consider the marginal economy E(A,B \ {i}). By
Theorem 2, no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
at pmin(A,B) in economy E(A,B). By removing buyer i, no set of goods is overdemanded at
pmin(A,B) in economy E(A,B\{i}). Now, consider a set of goods S which has positive prices
in pmin(A,B). Since S is not weakly underdemanded, we can write #B(S,pmin(A,B)) >
#S, and so #B(S,pmin(A, B)) ≥ #S + 1. In economy E(A,B \ {i}) the demand of buyers
in B \ {i} do not change at pmin(A,B). Hence the number of demanders of S in economy
E(A, B \ {i}) is equal to #B(S,pmin(A,B)) − 1 ≥ #S. Hence S is not underdemanded at
pmin(A,B) in economy E(A,B \ {i}). Since no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of
goods is underdemanded at pmin(A, B) in economy E(A,B \ {i}), pmin(A,B) is a WE price
vector of economy E(A,B \ {i}) (due to Theorem 1). By the lattice structure of the WE
price vector space, we get that pmin(A,B \ {i}) ≤ pmin(A,B) ≤ pmax(A,B \ {i}).
By Theorem 3, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded and no set of of goods is un-
derdemanded at pmax(A,B) in economy E(A,B). By removing a buyer i ∈ B, no set of
goods is weakly overdemanded at pmax(A,B) in economy E(A,B \ {i}). By Corollary 2,
pmax(A,B \ {i}) ≤ pmax(A,B).
Proof of (b): For some j ∈ A, consider the marginal economy E(A \ {j}, B). By
Theorem 3, no set of goods is underdemanded and no set of goods is weakly overdemanded
at pmax(A,B) in economy E(A,B). By removing a good j no set of goods is underdemanded
in economy E(A \ {j}, B) at pmax−j (A,B). Now consider S ⊆ (A \ {j, 0}). Let K be the
exclusive demanders of S at pmax−j (A,B) in economy E(A \ {j}, B). Buyers who are the
exclusive demanders of S ∪ {j} at pmax(A,B) in economy E(A,B) are the buyers from K
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plus the exclusive demanders of good j. With respect to economy E(A,B), we can write
#O(S∪{j},pmax(A,B)) = #O({j},pmax(A,B))+#K < #S+1 (since S∪{j} is not weakly
overdemanded at pmax(A,B)). Since {j} is not weakly overdemanded at pmax(A,B), we get
#O({j},pmax(A,B)) = 0. Therefore, #K < #S + 1, and so #K ≤ #S. Hence S is not
overdemanded at pmax−j (A,B) in economy E(A \ {j}, B). By Theorem 1, pmax−j (A,B) is a
WE price vector of economy E(A \ {j}, B). By the lattice structure of the set of WE price
vectors, we get pmin(A \ {j}, B) ≤ pmax−j (A,B) ≤ pmax(A \ {j}, B).
By Theorem 2, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at pmin(A,B) in economy
E(A, B). By removing a good j ∈ A, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at pmin−j (A,B)
in economy E(A \ {j}, B). By Corollary 1, pmin−j (A,B) ≤ pmin(A \ {j}, B). ¥
We remark that part of Theorem 5 is proved in Gul and Stacchetti (1999) (Theorem 7
in their paper). In a general model where buyers have gross substitutes valuations functions,
which is satisfied in our model, Gul and Stacchetti (1999) show that for all A ⊆ N , and for
all B ⊆ M : (a) pmin(A,B \ {i}) ≤ pmin(A,B) and pmax(A, B \ {i}) ≤ pmax(A,B) for all
i ∈ B; (b) pmin−j (A,B) ≤ pmin(A \ {j}, B) and pmax−j (A, B) ≤ pmax(A \ {j}, B) for all j ∈ A.
Our results in Theorem 5 are more general than this for the unit demand setting, in the
sense that we also show that pmin(A,B) is a WE price vector of economy E(A,B \ {i}) for
all i ∈ B and pmax−j (A, B) is a WE price vector of economy E(A \ {j}, B) for all j ∈ A. This
is not valid for the general model with gross substitutes valuations. Moreover, our proofs
use our characterization results, and are very different from the proof in Gul and Stacchetti
(1999).
As a corollary to Theorem 5, we have the following result (Corollary 3 is essentially the
new contribution of Theorem 5 with respect to Gul and Stacchetti (1999)).
Corollary 3 Consider any A ⊆ N with 0 ∈ A and B ⊆ M . pmin(A,B) is a WE price vector
of economy E(A,B \ {i}) for all i ∈ B and pmax−j (A,B) is a WE price vector of economy
E(A \ {j}, B) for all j ∈ A.
To summarize Theorem 5, by removing a buyer from an economy (essentially reducing
demand), the WE price vector lattice shifts downwards. Similarly, by removing a good from
an economy (essentially reducing supply), the WE price vector lattice shifts upwards (in
a dimension that is one less than the dimension of the original lattice). So, the standard
intuitions of economics that prices decrease with lowering of demand and increase with
lowering of supply continue to hold in our model.
Connections between WE price vectors and the VCG payments of buyers can be made
using Corollary 3. To remind, the VCG mechanism chooses an efficient allocation and asks
every buyer to pay his externality on other buyers. This allocation and payment scheme
makes it a strategy-proof and efficient mechanism. It can be shown, using standard lin-
ear programming duality arguments, that if pmin(N, M) is a WE price vector of economy
E(N, M) and therefore by Corollary 3 also a WE price vector of the marginal economy
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E(N, M \ {i}) for every i ∈ M , then the VCG payment of every buyer i ∈ M is pminµi (M, N),
where µ is an efficient allocation of economy E(M,N) (Mishra and Parkes, 2005) 5. This
proves that payments in a Walrasian equilibrium corresponding to the minimum Walrasian
price vector are precisely the VCG payments of buyers, a result first proved in Leonard
(1983) 6. But we can also relate the VCG payment of a buyer to the maximum WE price
vector of a marginal economy corresponding to that buyer using Corollary 3.
Proposition 1 For every buyer i ∈ M it holds that his VCG payment is equal to pmaxµi (N,M\
{i}), where µ is an efficient allocation chosen by the VCG mechanism.
Proof : For any A ⊆ N with 0 ∈ A and B ⊆ M , define V (A,B) as the total value of
the buyers in an efficient allocation of economy E(A,B) and let P (B,p) be the payoff of
the buyers in B at price vector p. If p is a WE price vector of economy E(A,B), then
V (A, B) = P (B,p) +
∑
j∈A pj (this can be deduced from standard linear programming
arguments, see for example Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002)). Now, consider an efficient
allocation µ of economy E(N, M). The claim clearly holds for buyer i ∈ M if µi = 0. For
µi 6= 0, the VCG payment of buyer i ∈ M can be written as
pV CGi = V (N, M \ {i})− V (N \ {µi},M \ {i})
= P (M \ {i},pmax(N, M \ {i})) +
∑
j∈N
pmaxj (N, M \ {i})
− P (M \ {i},pmax(N,M \ {i}))−
∑
j∈N\{µi}
pmaxj (N,M \ {i})
= pmaxµi (N, M \ {i}),
since by Corollary 3 it holds that pmax−µi (N, M \ {i}) is a WE price vector of economy
E(N \ {µi},M \ {i}). ¥
Since the VCG payments correspond to pmin(N,M), we have the following corollary of
Proposition 1.
Corollary 4 Let µ be an efficient allocation of economy E(N,M). Then pminµi (N, M) =
pmaxµi (N, M \ {i}) for all i ∈ M , and pminj (N,M) = 0 for all j ∈ N that is unassigned in µ.
Proposition 1 gives an alternative interpretation of the VCG payment of a buyer. The
VCG payment of a buyer is the maximum payment that can be received in a WE in the
marginal economy without him for the good assigned to him in the VCG mechanism. Corol-
lary 4 relates the minimum WE price vector of an economy to the maximum WE price
vector of its marginal economies corresponding to buyers. Such a relationship between the
maximum WE price vector and the minimum WE price vector of marginal economies corre-
sponding to goods does not hold. This can be verified from the example in Table 1.
5This result was proved for a general combinatorial auction model in Mishra and Parkes (2005).
6See also generalization of this result in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) for general combinatorial auction
models.
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5.2 Existing Iterative Auctions
Iterative auctions, where prices monotonically increase (ascending auctions) or decrease
(descending auctions) are practical and transparent methods to sell goods. The design
of iterative auctions for our model has been studied earlier - ascending auctions can be
found in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994), whereas descending auctions can be
found in Sotomayor (2002) and Mishra and Veeramani (2006) 7. These auctions termi-
nate at a WE price vector - the auctions in Demange et al. (1986), Sankaran (1994), and
Mishra and Veeramani (2006) terminate at the minimum WE price vector, while the auc-
tion in Sotomayor (2002) terminates at the maximum WE price vector 8. Moreover, the
underlying price adjustment in these auctions is based on the ideas of overdemanded and
underdemanded sets of goods. Interestingly, the papers on ascending auctions do not talk
about underdemanded sets of goods and use the notion overdemanded sets of goods only.
Similarly, the papers on descending auctions do not talk about overdemanded sets of goods
and use the notion of (weakly) underdemanded sets of goods only. The terminating con-
ditions in these auctions are absence of overdemanded sets of goods for ascending auctions
and absence of underdemanded sets of goods for descending auctions. Still, these auctions
terminate at an extreme WE price vector. Our results can be used to explain why this is
possible. In the rest of this section, we assume valuations of buyers and prices to be integers.
Consider the following class of ascending auctions:
S0 Start the auction at a price vector p where no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
(by Corollary 1, p ≤ pmin);
S1 Collect demand sets of buyers and check if an overdemanded set of goods exist;
S2 If no overdemanded set of goods exist, then stop (by Theorem 2, this is the minimum
WE price vector);
S3 Else increase prices of goods such that no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at
the new price vector, and repeat from Step (S1).
The auctions in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994) are such auctions, though
they do not seem to mention this explicitly. Both the auctions start from the zero price
vector 9. At the zero price vector, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded. In Step (S3),
Demange et al. (1986) increase prices by unity for goods in a minimal overdemanded set,
7The auction in (Mishra and Veeramani, 2006) is an ascending auction for a procurement (production)
economy. An ascending auction in a procurement economy translates to a descending auction in our model.
8Since minimum WE price vector corresponds to the VCG payments, the auctions in Demange et al.
(1986), Sankaran (1994), and Mishra and Veeramani (2006) have truthful bidding in an equilibrium, whereas
buyers can manipulate the auction in Sotomayor (2002).
9To be precise, they use the reserve price of every good as the starting price, which is assumed to be zero
in our model.
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whereas Sankaran (1994) increases prices by unity for goods in an overdemanded set, which
he finds using a labeling algorithm of graph theory. Both the price adjustments ensure that
no set of goods is weakly underdemanded after the price increase (i.e., satisfy Step (S3)),
and we stay below the minimum WE price vector (by Corollary 1).
The descending auctions share an analogous feature. Consider the following class of
descending auctions:
S0 Start the auction at a price vector p where no set of goods is weakly overdemanded
(by Corollary 2, p ≥ pmax);
S1 Collect demand sets of buyers and check if an underdemanded set of goods exist;
S2 If no underdemanded set of goods exist, then stop (by Theorem 3, this is the maximum
WE price vector);
S3 Else decrease prices of goods such that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded at the
new price vector, and repeat from Step (S1).
The auction in Sotomayor (2002) starts from a very high price vector where every buyer
demands only the dummy good. Hence no set of goods is weakly overdemanded. By de-
creasing prices by unity for goods in a minimal underdemanded set, no set of goods is weakly
overdemanded after the price decrease, and the price in the auction stays above the max-
imum WE price vector. The auction in Mishra and Veeramani (2006) runs the auction in
Sotomayor (2002) first, and then decreases prices of a weakly underdemanded set of goods.
Their price adjustment ensures that no set of goods is overdemanded in any iteration, and
the auction terminates when no set of goods is weakly underdemanded (by Theorem 2, this
is the minimum WE price vector). The auction in Mishra and Veeramani (2006) can be
modified along the lines of the descending auctions described above. In this modification,
the descending auction can start from any price vector p where no set of goods is overde-
manded. Then prices are decreased until no set of goods is weakly underdemanded. When
decreasing prices of goods in a minimal weakly underdemanded set, no set of goods becomes
overdemanded. By Theorem 2, the final price vector of this auction is the minimum WE
price vector.
6 Conclusions
We characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors for economies with indivisible goods
and unit demand. Our characterizations are based on the notions of overdemanded sets of
goods and underdemanded sets of goods. These notions also lead to characterizations of
extreme points of the Walrasian equilibrium price vector space. As a consequence of these
characterizations, we are able to classify the space of price vectors into regions where (weakly)
overdemanded and (weakly) underdemanded goods are guaranteed to exist. We discuss some
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implications of such a classification, including how the space of Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors looks in marginal economies and how it forms the underlying basis of iterative auction
design.
A generalization of our characterizations, for settings where buyers can be assigned more
than one good, is a useful direction of future research. However, Walrasian equilibrium
may fail to exist in such general settings, except under specific types of valuations called
gross substitutes valuations (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Gross substitutes valuations not
only ensure existence of Walrasian equilibrium, but also ensure that the space of Walrasian
equilibrium price vectors form a lattice (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Under gross substitutes
valuations, the concept of overdemanded goods has been generalized in Gul and Stacchetti
(2000) 10, where they design ascending auctions using this concept. It remains to be seen
whether our characterizations can be extended to gross substitutes valuations.
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